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If there is a God, then there seems to be significant hindrances or obstacles 
in the way in which God reveals himself to his creation. What are these 
obstacles? Can these obstacles be overcome? Are there necessary limits to 
the way in which God must operate when it comes to divine revelation? 
If there are necessary limits, is this a feature of the created order or is this 
a feature of God himself? Given these limitations, what sort of divine acts 
must God use in order to reveal himself (pp. 1-3)?
In Obstacles to Divine Revelation, rolfe King provides some stimulating 
answers to the above questions and, interestingly, brings the discussion 
to the centre of epistemology. It is the latter contribution, I  think, that 
is unique to King’s project. His project begins, however, by answering 
an essential question: What is revelation? King defines revelation as: 
“God’s self-disclosure, in any form, leading to some kind of awareness, or 
knowledge, of him” (p. 5).
From this, one might assume that God’s options for revealing himself 
are limitless. However, King rightly notes that God’s options are limited 
given that the people that he wishes to communicate with are also limited 
(p. 54). If God, for example, chose to reveal himself with distinct clarity 
and undeniable evidence in the uDFy galaxy (13 billion light years away) 
it would do little in convincing his creation of himself. So if God does 
indeed wish to reveal himself (something traditional theism affirms), 
then he must do so in such a way that reflects the capacities of his limited 
creation (e.g., by not revealing himself in galaxies to which we will never 
have access).
So if God’s options for revelation are indeed limited, this might be 
considered the first obstacle to his revelatory plan. This obstacle, as King 
notes, says nothing about God and everything about his creation. This 
is why King understands obstacles to divine revelation as: “Any feature 
of the created order that may either block or hinder a  form of divine 
disclosure, or has in some way to be overcome in order for God to 
disclose himself.” (p. 5).
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These features, whatever they might be, must be located within the 
created order. but what, exactly, are these features? And how exactly 
does one go about identifying these features? The two principles that 
King suggests to identify the features that hinder revelation are the 
epistemic-revelatory principle (erP) and the revelatory-context principle 
(rcP) (pp. 39-40). The former principle claims that epistemic problems 
concerning evidence (interpreted quite broadly) are an obstacle to divine 
revelation (p. 9), while rcP claims that a specific context is required in 
order for God to reveal himself in a way that is comprehensible by his 
creatures. All obstacles to revelation, according to King, fall into the 
above categories –  they are either epistemic problems or contextual 
problems (pp. 40-41). 
I find erP more interesting, and more controversial I might add. erP, 
for example, makes the claim that God might have difficulty revealing 
himself insofar as our epistemic position lacks complete discernment 
of the available evidence. The “eden parable” illustrates this nicely 
(pp.  44-47). In the parable the angels are talking amongst themselves 
about all the different ways in which God might reveal himself to his new 
creation. Despite the available options, they all seem plagued by the fact 
that there is no assurance the creatures will trust the revelation (some 
experience for example) to be evidence of what God is trying to reveal 
(perhaps that he exists and that he loves them). Scepticism looms, despite 
the potentially good revelatory intentions. 
but, King suggests, there is another option available to God – one that 
isn’t dependent on the difficult task of matching belief with the available 
evidence. King notes that this option, which he calls direct cognition, 
might potentially undermine his central claim that there are indeed 
obstacles to revelation (p. 60). This worry, however, seems unnecessary. 
even if there is direct cognition, one might assume that this feature has 
been corrupted (by sin for example) and thus doesn’t always function the 
way it was intended. This aside, it is King’s understanding of Plantinga (as 
it relates to direct cognition) that deserves more attention. 
King’s discussion of Plantinga is very interesting, but ultimately, 
I think, mistaken. King’s key claim is that Plantinga’s model is (1) a form 
of direct cognition and that (2) direct cognition should be understood 
as divine self-testimony. And that in order for testimony to be trusted, 
(3)  there needs to be decisive evidence that the testifier can in fact 
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be trusted (pp.  76-77,  100). If (1)–(3) is true, then the problem with 
Plantinga’s model seems obvious. After all, if belief in God is directly 
acquired by some properly functioning faculty, the belief still wouldn’t be 
warranted, according to King, since there is no evidence that the faculty is 
in fact functioning properly (p. 78). Without getting into all the nuances 
of the debate here, I  think the point to stress is that (3) is false. even 
if Plantinga’s model is a form of testimony (which is questionable), not 
all models in the current epistemology of testimony would concede (3) 
given that it’s not at all clear that there needs to be decisive evidence that 
the testifier can in fact be trusted. You might think that testimony is non-
inferential, which is consistent with Plantinga’s claim that belief in God is 
properly basic. Thus, the claim would simply be that there couldn’t be any 
defeating evidence against the testimony of the testifier. This is known as 
the defeater clause, which Plantinga’s model rightly incorporates. 
At any rate, however one feels about the above understanding, the 
point that King is trying to make is that any account of direct cognition is 
plagued by the issue of trust. And the requirements concerning evidence 
and the necessity of trust bring us closer to King’s position. King’s position, 
then, is that evidence and trust are both necessary given that any (special) 
revelation necessarily involves testimony (p. 194). This being the case, 
King provides a solution to the trust problem and claims, as was seen in 
the critique of Plantinga, that sufficient evidence is needed for trust. King 
calls this trust-evidentialism (p. 176). 
The obvious question is whether God can provide such evidence. but 
in asking this question, we are immediately faced with a dilemma. The 
dilemma, as described by King, is that “God cannot give us any evidence 
for special revelation independently of self-testifying in some way that the 
evidence is due to him. but we need independent evidence to rationally 
trust that this purported revelation is from God” (his emphasis, p. 251). 
King’s response to this is that “although God cannot give us evidence 
independent of his self-testimony we may be able to find such evidence” 
(p. 197). This point isn’t as confusing or controversial as it sounds. For 
example, it was argued by King that there are certain limitations in the 
ways that God can reveal himself given our limitations. This being the 
case, there must be some necessary structure in which God will reveal 
himself. And the necessary structure of this revelation must take into 
account our limitations. So if we can discern what exactly the necessary 
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structure of revelation is, we can then know what kind of evidence to 
look for (see pp.  176-178). King gives several suggestions that I  won’t 
recount here (see pp. 177-181, 197, 201-205), but the point that should be 
taken is that this evidence would provide the basis for what King claims 
to be central to divine disclosure – trust. 
So, then, there is the initial evidence that King finds necessary for 
trust. but, it seems, we are still plagued with the problem of properly 
evaluating the evidence that would lead to knowledge of God. After all, 
it’s not objectively clear that the evidence does anything beyond giving 
the initial trust or confidence to think some divine testimony might be 
compelling. This is where King’s journey-epistemology becomes becomes 
important. As King notes, “all I can do is to try to find the best grounds 
on which to base my trust” (p. 200). And this initial trust will be subject 
to reasons of the heart (suspicions, fears, personal goals, etc. p. 214). So 
it’s a journey in that the evidence (the evidence that initiates trust) is not 
sufficient to know (in this case perhaps God’s existence), but it is both 
necessary and sufficient to get you on your journey. 
While the significance of the arguments presented above depend, 
I think, on the truth of (3), I find King’s Obstacles to Divine Revelation 
both interesting and compelling. Students and scholars who work in 
religious epistemology and philosophy of religion will find King’s work 
to be of value as it examines and advances many contemporary issues in 
those fields. 
